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Employee Stock- Ownership Plans and Corporate
Takeovers: Restraints on the Use of ESOPs by
Corporate Officers and Directors to Avert
Hostile Takeovers
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement and Income Security
Act (ERISA), which was designed to promote employee benefit plans and
provide safeguards for the assets of the plans. An employee stock owner-
ship plan is a device used by corporations which holds corporate stock as
the primary asset of the employee benefit plan. Recently, corporate execu-
tives have seized the opportunity to use ESOPs as a defensive tactic for
averting takeovers considered to be adverse to the corporation However,
provisions of ERISA, particularly relating to fiduciary duty, exclusve
benefit,and prudence, seriously impede the use of an ESOP by incumbent
management to avert takeovers. Thzs article outlines and discusses ER-
ISA and its application to corporate management utilizing an ESOP to
avert a corporate takeover.
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate takeovers' involve complex issues of corporate law,
securities regulation, finance and most recently, employee benefit
plans.2 The stakes and rewards are high in the corporate takeover
1. A corporate takeover occurs when one entity seeks to assume control or
management of another corporation. The initiating entity, whether an individual
or a corporation, is known as a "raider." The corporation which is the subject of
the takeover is referred to as the "target" corporation. On February 7, 1983, the
Securities and Exchange Commission announced the formation of a 15-member
panel to render advice to Congress regarding any changes in tender offer regula-
tions. The committee specifically analyzes regulatioas affecting corporate take-
overs. The members of the panel include attorneys representing the four
corporations involved in the Bendix-Martin Marietta takeover and merger transac-
tions. L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1983, Part IV at 3. See snfra note 3.
2. The term "employee benefit plan" is defined in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (Supp. V 1981) (amended 1982)
[hereinafter cited as ERISAJ. Al references to ERISA appearng throughout this
article are to the 1982 amended version. 29 U.S.C. §1002 defines an employee pen-
sion benefit plan to be:
[a] ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter estab-
lished or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or
by both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surround-
ing circumstances such plan, fund or program-
(A) provides retirement income to employees, or
(B) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending
to the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the
method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of
scenario. Recent headlines covering the Bendix-Martin Marietta-
Allied-United Technology takeover, acquisition, and merger have
exposed the general public to the strong personalities of corpo-
rate officers and directors as well as to the legal and financial in-
tricacies involved in a corporate takeover. An employee stock
ownership plan played an important role in the Bendix-Martin
Marietta takeover attempt. The potential influence of an em-
ployee stock ownership plan may determine the future ownership
and control of a corporation. 3
calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing
benefits from the plan.
See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
3. On August 25, 1982, Bendix Corporation, a Delaware corporation headquar-
tered in Michigan, announced its intention to purchase up to 45% of Martin Mari-
etta Corporation's stock. The acquisition, a combination cash and exchange
tender offer by Bendix, amounted to $1.5 billion. On August 30, 1982, Martin Mari-
etta retaliated by offering to buy Bendix shares at a price of $75.00 per share. The
two-part bid for Bendix included a $75.00 per share offer for 11.9 million shares of
Bendix stock. The potential purchase represented 50% of the 23.7 million out-
standing Bendix common shares. The second step was a proposal to acquire the
balance of Bendix's shares in exchange for Martin Marietta stock valued at $5.00
per share.
The "Pac-Man" strategy continued. Bendix sought to acquire Marietta; Marietta
sought to acquire Bendix. A "gray knight" came to Martin Marietta's aid. United
Technology, acting as a Martin Marietta ally, launched a tender offer for 50.3% of
the Bendix stock at the price of $75.00 per share. To avoid potential antitrust viola-
tions, Martin Marietta and United Technology agreed to divide up Bendix if either
party was successful in its takeover bid.
Bendix reacted to the Martin Marietta-United Technology alliance by increasing
its tender offer price from $43.00 per share to $48.00 per share. Martin Marietta
promptly rejected the offer. On September 9, 1982, Bendix rejected United Tech-
nology's offer as "grossly inadequate." Bendix increased its offering for Martin
Marietta stock from 45% to 55%. In an attempt to merge the companies on a
friendly basis, United Technology's chairman, Harry Gray, offered $85.00 per share
for Bendix stock. Bendix declined the offer on September 15, 1982. On September
17, 1982, Bendix consummated the purchase of Martin Marietta stock. Seventy
percent of Martin Marietta stock was purchased for approximately $1.2 billion. As
a majority shareholder, Bendix demanded resignation of Martin Marietta's board
of directors at a shareholders' meeting. Martin Marietta refused.
Martin Marietta's offer for Bendix stock continued. Bendix approached Martin
Marietta seeking a peaceful solution to no avail. On September 22, Allied Corpora-
tion entered the corporate takeover arena with an offer to merge with Bendix at a
cost of $1.9 billion. Citibank, the trustee for the Bendix employee stock ownership
plan [hereinafter referred to as ESOP] withdrew the 4,479,000 shares previously
tendered to Martin Marietta. This offer of ESOP shares by the trustee, Citibank,
was sharply denounced by Bendix's management as not being in the best interest
of the employee participants.
Martin Marietta bought 44% of the Bendix stock on September 23, 1982. On Sep-
tember 24, the takeover battle which involved four major corporations ended. Al-
lied struck a tentative agreement with Martin Marietta. Bendix, the initiator of
the takeover scenario, was now controlled by Allied. This proved to be an ironic
outcome for Bendix, considering it sought to be the proud owner of Martin Mari-
etta at the onset. See generally, Wall Street Journal, August 26, through Septem-
ber 24, 1982; THE AMERicAN LAWYER, Feb. 1983, p. 35-39. Mr. Agee resigned as
Chairman of Bendix effective June 1, 1983. (L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 1983, Part IV, at 1).
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To avoid corporate takeovers, defensive actions may be taken
before or after the initial move by the corporate raider.4 The deci-
sion to either succumb to or avert the takeover is made by the
board of directors of the target corporation. Each company, using
its investment bankers, attorneys, accountants, and public rela-
tion specialists must develop its own defense strategy and tac-
tics. 5 Several factors must be considered in formulating a defense
strategy. These factors include the circumstances of the takeover,
the particular opponent, and the opponent's individual strengths
and weaknesses.6
One possible defense technique for a corporation threatened by
a takeover is the use of an employee stock ownership plan or em-
ployee stock ownership trust (hereinafter collectively referred to
as an ESOP).7 ESOPs have been recognized as a possible pre-of-
fer defense by target corporations as well.8
4. The defense measures include but are not limited to:
(a) repurchase of its corporate securities to make it less likely for the corporate
raider to obtain control of the company through the tender offer;
(b) induce friendly third parties to make open market purchases of the target
company's securities;
(c) issue additional shares of classes of stock. SEC Act Release No. 15,230 (Oct.
13, 1978) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,748 n.3. See generally Quinn, How to Avoid
Unwanted Takeover, CORP. GUIDE (P-H) 26,061; Lipton, Steinberger, TAKEOVERS
AND FREEZEOUTrS (1978), Chapter 6.
5. See Quinn, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 defines the term "employee stock ownership plan"
as follows:
The term "employee stock ownership plan" means an individual account
plan-
(A) Which is a stock bonus plan which is qualified, or a stock bonus plan
and money purchase both of which are qualified, under section 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and which is designed to invest primarily
in qualifying employee securities....
See also infra notes 55-85 and accompanying text.
8. Quinn, supra note 4, a: 26,386. (The existence of an ESOP will normally
provide substantial additional stock in the hands of friendly parties). See also,
SEC Act Release No. 15,230, 15,235, supra note 4, in which an ESOP was noted as a
possible takeover prevention tactic. This fact must be disclosed in a proxy state-
ment. Defensive corporate charter amendments or provisions may include but are
not limited to: "creation of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan which, because of
its size, percentage of total outstanding securities of the issuer which it may own,
voting or other provisions to be used in defense in a contested takeover attempt."
Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein, Developments in Tender Offers for Corporate Control
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments 1. Comment, ESOP and Universal Capi-
talism, 31 TAx L. REV. 289, 295 [hereinafter cited as Carlson]; Testa & Bachelder,
ESOPs and TRASOPS 1979, at 131 (1979); Lipton, supra note 4, at 277.
ESOPs may be utilized prior to or during a tender offer.9 The
tender offer is the most popular corporate takeover scheme used
as compared to other possible methods, such as proxy solicitation.
The target corporation may issue stock to the ESOP. This action
averts a takeover in two ways. First, it dilutes the voting strength
of the stock held by the offeror.l0 Second, the issuance of stock
increases the amount of stock the raider must acquire in order to
obtain voting control."
An ESOP was used to avoid a corporate takeover in Podesta v.
Calumet Industries, Inc. 12 The District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois granted a preliminary injunction13 to sterilize
the votes of those shares which were transferred to the ESOP.14
The incumbent management had attempted to control the voting
rights of the corporation through the adoption of the ESOP and
the transfer of corporate shares thereto. Not only did the court
enjoin the voting of the ESOP shares, but further found the action
of the management of Calumet Industries to be a breach of their
fiduciary duty.15
More recently, the use of an ESOP to dodge a hostile takeover
attempt was the basis of a lawsuit in Donovan v. Bierwirth. 16 To
avoid the takeover of Grumman Corporation by LTV Corporation,
the trustees for the Grumman ESOP bought a substantial block
9. An orthodox tender offer is a publicly made invitation, usually announced
in a newspaper advertisement, to all shareholders of a corporation, to tender their
shares for sale at a specifled price. To induce'the shareholders to sell, the price
usually includes a premium over the current market price of the target company's
shares. Cash or other securities may be offered to the shareholders as considera-
tion. An offer is made for a limited period of time. The offeror may offer to buy all
tendered shares, or it may offer to buy only a stated number. In general, the of-
feror sets a minimum number of shares that must be tendered before he will buy
any shares. The Williams Act regulates transactions other than orthodox tender
offers. See Developments, supra note 8, at 1-34. Neither Congress nor the SEC has
attempted to define the term "tender offer." Id. at p.1. See generally Note, The De-
veloping Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86
HAxv. L. REV. 1250, 1251-54 (1973); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REv. 377,
377-81 (1969).
10. See Developments, supra note 8, at 198.
11. Id.
12. 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,433 (D.N. Ill. May 9, 1978). See also
Calumet Indus., Inc. v. MacClure, 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CHH) 96,434 (D.N. Ill.
May 3, 1978) (accompanying case involving disclosure requirements under SEC
regulations and proxy solicitation).
13. Podesta v. Calumet Indus., Inc., 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), at 93,549.
Injunctive relief is one of the remedies available in actions brought under ERISA
for violation of the Act in the use of ESOPs as a tool for thwarting corporate take-
over attempts. See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
14. Podesta v. Calumet Indus., Inc., 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), at 93,549.
15. Id. See also infra notes 118-52 and accompanying text.
16. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), a~g and modifying 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y.
1981). On October 19, 1981, in the first action of its kind against a large corporate
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of Grumman stock. The action was ostensibly for the benefit of
the employee participants and beneficiaries. LTV's attempted
takeover, although eventually thwarted, presents an interesting
and comprehensive demonstration of the impact of the utilization
of an ESOP to avoid a corporate takeover.
The purpose of this article is to familiarize the reader with the
basic concepts and policy behind the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 197417 [hereinafter referred to as ERISA]
which provides the framework within which an ESOP is estab-
lished and operates. Further, the establishment of an ESOP and
the restrictions placed upon a corporate director and/or officer in
using the ESOP as a defense technique during a proposed corpo-
rate takeover are discussed. These restrictions, specifically the
fiduciary standards of "exclusive benefit"' 8 and "prudent man"19
set forth in ERISA severly hinder the employment of an ESOP as
a potential tactic in a company's defense strategy. In conclusion,
ESOPs, although a powerful resource,20 should be used exclu-
sively for the benefit of employee participants and beneficiaries-
not for the primary benefit of the corporation and its incumbent
management in fending off a hostile takeover attempt.
II. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974
A. Statutory Scheme
ERISA is a comprehensive remedial statute2 l designed to offer
pension fund, the Department of Labor (DOL) filed suit under ERISA against the
plan trustees, charging the fiduciaries:
1) failed to act solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries [in
violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (A)];
2) failed to invest prudently [in violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C)];
3) dealt with the plan's assets in their own interest [in violation of § 1106(b)(1)];
and,
4) acted on behalf of parties whose interests were, adverse to the interests of the
plan and its participants and beneficiaries [in violation of § 1106(b) (2)]. Peat
Marwick & Co., Issues and Answers, No. 1981-82, p. 2.
17. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461; see infra notes 21-51 and accompanying text.
18. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103 (c) (1), 404(a) (1) (A).
19. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B); see infra notes 168-89 and accompanying
text.
20. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
21. Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under ERISA of
1974, 88 HARv. L. REV. 960, 961 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fiduciary Standards].
Section 1001(b) of ERISA sets forth the policy of the Act:
[TIhe policy of this Act [is] to protect interstate commerce and the inter-
ests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by
employee participants 22 and. beneficiaries2 3 protection with re-
spect to pensions and other benefits accrued during employment.
From the date of its enactment, ERISA has had tremendous im-
pact not only upon pension plan sponsors, employee participants,
and beneficiaries, but also upon the multitude of individuals and
institutions providing services, advice, and counsel to the plans.24
ERISA imposes broad uniform standards governing the operation
of the employee benefit plan to assure employees that they will
receive anticipated benefits at retirement or when the plan is
terminated. 25
The purpose of ERISA is two-fold. First, it provides protection
for employees against abuses related to employee benefit plans.
Second, it improves the equitable nature and financial soundness
of these plans. 2 6 The incentive for such a comprehensive and
broad-sweeping statute27 was spawned by the rapid growth, in
size, scope, and number, of employee benefit plans offering post-
requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of
financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of em-
ployee benefits plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanc-
tions and ready access to the Federal courts.
Id. See also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978); M & R Inv. Co., Inc. v.
Fitzsimmons, 484 F. Supp. 1041, 1054 (D. Nev. 1980).
22. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(7) defines a participant in an employee benefit
plan:
The term "participant" means any employee or former employee of an
employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization,
who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an em-
ployee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer or members
of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any
such benefit.
Id.
23. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(8) defines a beneficiary of an employee benefits
plan. "The term 'beneficiary' means a person designated by a participant, or by
the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit
thereunder." Id.
24. Little & Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30
VAND. L. REv. 1, 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fiduciaries Under ERISA ]. See gen-
erally Lamon, Professional Money Managers: Fiduciary Responsibility Under ER-
ISA, 11 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL 519 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Professional Money Managers].
25. See Fiduciary Standards, supra note 21, at 961.
26. Note, Multiple Employer Trusts, Preemption, and ERISA: A Case for Fed-
eral Regulation and a Proposal for Statutory Reform, 65 MINN. L. REv. 459, 463
(1981).
27. Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n and Glaziers and Glassworkers Pension
Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378 (D. Hawaii 1980); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Quimet
Corp., 470 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mass 1979), aff'd 630 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied
450 U.S. 914 (1981); A-T-O, Inc. v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 456 F. Supp.
545 (N.D. Ohio 1978), rev'd 64 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1980); Nachman Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp., 436 F. Supp, 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1977), rev'd 592 F.2d 947 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 940, aff'd 446 U.S. 359, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 901
(1980).
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employment compensation.28
In interpreting the statutory language of ERISA, a liberal con-
struction is required to safeguard the interests of the plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries in addition to preserving the integrity of
pension plan assets.29 ERISA places restrictions on interested
parties 30 in administering plans.3 1 Enforcement of the statutory
provisions is accomplished through taxation 32 and civil33 or crimi-
nal sanctions. 34
Under ERISA, every employee benefit plan shall be established
28. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) states Congress' findings and declaration of pol-
icy with repect to the enactment of ERISA:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of em-
ployee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial...
that the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and
their dependents are directly affected by these plans; that they are af-
fected with a national public interest; that they have become an important
factor affecting the stablity of employment and the successful develop-
ment of industrial relations....
Id. See also Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 1979).
29. Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (D.N.J. 1980) (citing Marshall v.
Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 349 (W.D. Okla. 1978)); see also Matter of M & M Trans. Co.,
3 B.R. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
30. An interested party is defined in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) as follows:
The term "party in interest" means, as to an employee benefit plan-
(A) any fiduciary (including but not limited to, any administrator, of-
ficer, trustee, or custodian), counsel or employee of such employee benefit
plan;
(B) a person providing services to such plan;
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan;
(H) an employee, officer, director...
Id.
31. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 states the fiduciary duties to be exercised under an
employee benefit plan. See infra notes 55-85 and accompanying text.
32. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.],
§ 4975 (West 1982).
33. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 is the provision providing for civil enforcement of
ERISA. See also Sanchez, Cain & Wood, The Pension Reform Act of 1974: Fiduci-
ary Responsibility and Prohibited Transactions, 6 TAX ADVISER 86 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Fiduciary Responsibility]. See generally infra notes 198-212 and
accompanying text.
34. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 states the criminal penalties which may be im-
posed for violations of the statutory provisions under ERISA:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of part 1 of this subtitle,
or any regulation or order issued under any such provision, shall upon
conviction be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; except that in the case of such violation by a person not an
individual, the fine imposed upon such person shall be a fine not exceed-
ing $100,000.
Id. See generally infra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
and maintained pursuant to a written instrument.35 Plans are cat-
egorized either as defined benefit3 6 or defined contribution 3 7
plans. The employer, as plan sponsor, bears all the investment
risks in a defined benefit plan. If investment performance falls
short of projected goals, larger contributions to the plan's funding
account is necessary to protect the employees' interest.38 A de-
fined contribution plan does not pay any fixed or determinable
benefit. Benefits to participants and beneficiaries vary depending
on contributions made by the employer, the employee, the invest-
ment success of the plan, and the allocations of benefits forfeited
by non-vested participants who terminate employment. The risk
of poor investment is shifted from the plan sponsor to the em-
ployees in a defined contribution employee benefit plan such as
an ESOP.39
Congress intended fund trustees to possess broad managerial
and administrative discretion in the operation of the fund.40 This
broad managerial discretion places primary responsibility for the
establishment and operation of the plan, including claim proce-
dures, upon the trustees.4 1
The federal courts, 42 in interpreting ERISA, should pay careful
35. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) states: "Every employee benefit plan shall
be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument." Id. Addition-
ally, the plan document must include: 1.) the naming of the fiduciaries who are in
control and manage plan operation; 2.) a description of any procedures for allocat-
ing responsibility among named fiduciaries and for delegation of responsibilities to
others, including delegation of responsibility for asset management to an invest-
ment manager; 3.) a description of procedures for amending the plan; 4.) a descrip-
tion of the basis for making contributions to the plan or distributions from the
plan; and, 5.) a description of procedures for establishing and carrying out a fund-
ing policy and method consistent with the requirements of ERISA. Sporn, Work-
ing with the New Rules of Fiduciary Responsibility in the 1974 Pension Reform
Act, 41 J. TAx'N 263, 267 (1974); see also ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) & (b).
36. See Fiduciary Standards, supra note 21, at 961-62; 1982 PENS. & PROFIT
SHARING (P-H) 9,165. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) defines a "defined benefit
plan" to be: "a pension plan other than an individual account plan; except that a
pension plan which is not an individual account plan and which provides a benefit
derived from employer contributions which is based partly on the balance of the
separate account of a participant ... ." Id.
37. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) defines a "defined contribution plan" as: "a
pension plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for
benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account,
and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of
other participants which may be allocated to such participant's account." Id. See
generally SEC Rel. No. 3-6188, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1,051.
38. See Professional Money Managers, supra note 24, at 523.
39. Id.
40. Taylor v. Bakery and Confectionary Union and Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund,
455 F. Supp. 816, 819 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
41. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 485 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (E.D. Mo. 1980). See also
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.
42. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) states in pertinent part: "the district courts
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attention to existing practice in the financial community and to
the prescription of modern investment theory. 43 Since its enact-
ment, over three thousand lawsuits have been filed under Title 1
of ERISA.44 The courts have adjudicated questions involving a
number of its most important provisions, specifically those relat-
ing to fiduciary duties of plan trustees. The reviewing court may
interfere in the administration of an ESOP or any other employee
benefit plan only where the trustee's actions are arbitrary, capri-
cious or an abuse of discretion.45 Obligations of trustees and limi-
tations on their power of investment are generally interpreted
under principles applicable to trustees pursuant to the common
law of trusts.46 However, the court shall adjudicate provisions of
ERISA with a view toward establishing uniform standards. 47
Thus, in'the absence of statutory guidance and judicial precedent,
the law of trusts, especially that pertaining to the requirement of
even-handed treatment of beneficiaries,48 is particularly relevant.
B. The Common Law of Trusts-Foundation for ERISA
The provisions of ERISA addressing fiduciary standards, specif-
ically the "exclusive benefit" and '"prudent man" requirements
derived therefrom, are largely based upon common law trust prin-
ciples. The fiduciary responsibility standards set forth in Part 4 of
Title 1 of ERISA are a codification of certain principles developed
of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this ti-
tle brought by the Secretary [of Labor] or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduci-
ary .. " Id. Additionally, ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f) states: "[tihe district courts
of the United States shall have jurisdiction, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or the citizenship of the parties, to grant . . . relief. ... Id. Thus, fed-
eral jurisdiction over causes of action arising under the statutory provisions of
ERISA falls within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1974) (federal question).
43. Fiduciary Standards, supra note 21, at 969.
44. Gallagher, Recent Developments in Concept Relating to Fiduciary Liabil-
ity, 16 F. 753, 753 (1981); see also Trudgeon, Recent Litigation Regarding Fiduciary
Responsibility Under ERISA, 7 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 250 (1981).
45. Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Bueneman v.
Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209
(8th Cir. 1978); Phillis v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1976); Maness v. Wil-
liams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1975).
46. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
47. Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund, 458 F. Supp. 986, 990
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
48. 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 183 (3d ed. 1967). See infra notes 49-54 and accompany-
ing text.
and applied in the law of trusts.49 However, the fiduciary of an
ESOP has more freedom and opportunity to make investment de-
cisions than a common law trustee.50 In the absence of statutory
provisions, precedent established under the law of trusts is partic-
ularly relevant.5 1 In addition, any interpretation under ERISA
and the principles applicable to trustees under the common law
of trusts must be accomplished with the objective of establishing
uniform standards. 52
Under the principles of equity, a trustee bears an unwavering
duty of complete loyalty to the beneficiary. The rule against a
trustee dividing his loyalty53 must be enforced with uncompro-
mising rigidity.54 Such strict enforcement of trustee standards se-
verely limits any possibility of utilizing an ESOP primarily for
averting a corporate takeover. The employment of an ESOP by a
trustee who may also be a director conflicts directly with the pri-
mary duty of a trustee-loyalty to the beneficiary. A director has
a primary loyalty to the corporation. In cases involving the use of
ESOPs, courts have scrutinized the action taken and have often
relied upon the initial breach of loyalty of a trustee as a basis for
liability.
49. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 deals specifically with fiduciary duties. See infra
notes 118-52 and accompanying text.
50. H. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4639. The trustees need not be faced with problems arising from ten-
sions between a beneficiary and remainderman in a private trust wherein the ben-
eficiary is concerned in high income investments and the remainderman is
interested in preserving the corpus of the trust. The private trust receives its capi-
tal only at the inception of the trust. Under a pension plan, new funds are contrib-
uted regularly which frees the trustee from liquidity pressures. See Fiduciary
Standards, supra note 21, at 968.
51. The Department of Labor provisions apply rules and remedies similar to
those under traditional trust law governing the conduct of fiduciaries. 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 5076.
52. "The objectives of these provisions are to make applicable the law of
trusts; ... to establish uniform fiduciary standards to prevent transactions which
dissipate or endanger plan assets, and to provide effective remedies for breaches
of trust." Marshall v. Teamster Local 282 Pension Trust Fund, 458 F. Supp. 986, 990
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5186).
53. Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977). In Heit, a shareholder
brought a derivative action alleging that the board of directors, forewarned of a po-
tential control contest by a minority shareholder, issued a large block of new
stock. The new stock was placed in the hands of three of its seven board mem-
bers. The shareholder alleged that the transactions were effected only to thwart
threatened control contests and that such action by the board of directors was a
violation of the Securities and Exchange Act as well as a breach of common law
fiduciary duties.
54. NRLB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1981) (quoting Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928)) (action brought under the Labor
Management Relations Act).
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III. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ESOP
Before discussing the manner in which an ESOP may be used
to avoid a corporate takeover, it is necessary to understand how
an ESOP is established. Special financial and legal aspects must
be complied with for the proper set-up and operation of an ESOP.
In 1974, ERISA recognized stock bonus plans55 as a qualified
contribution plan.56 ERISA marked the creation of an ESOP-"a
device by which an employer corporation uses a qualified pension
or profit sharing trust to obtain the use of capital funds which can
be repaid out of pre-tax earnings. 57
An ESOP is a tax-qualified plan under which employer stock58
is held for the benefit of employees. 59 Legislative history illus-
tiates that the basic element common to all ESOPs is the classifi-
cation as a qualified bonus plan designed primarily to invest in
qualifying securities of an employer whose employees are cov-
ered by the plan.60 The stock held by the tax-exempt trust under
55. See supra note 7. An ESOP is a stock bonus plan, or a stock bonus and
money purchase pension plan, that is: (a) qualified under § 401 of the Internal
Revenue Code; (b) designed to invest primarily in stock or market obligations of
the employer; and, (c) designed to provide for an individual bonus or retirement
account for each participant employee and for benefits based solely upon the
amount contributed to the participant's account. Developments, supra note 8, at
97.
56. "Qualified" means the plan has been approved by the Internal Revenue
Service. I.R.C. § 401(a) (West 1982) sets forth the requirements for a plan to qual-
ify. Briefly:
The requirements for section 401(a) are complex and grow more so from
day to day through both legislation and administrative regulation. In very
rough outline, a qualified plan must not categorically exclude young, old
or short service employee,; from participant; neither contributions nor
benefits under the plan may discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders
or highly compensated employees; certain minimum standards for the
funding and vesting of benefits must be met; and benefits must conform to
certain rules as to their maximum amount and as to their form and time
of payment.
Carlson, supra note 8, at 293 n.16.
57. Carlson, supra note 8, at 293.
58. The employer stock purchased by the ESOP must be "qualified employer
stock." ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(1) states: "[a] plan may not acquire or hold -
(A) any employer security which is not a qualifying employer security .... Id.
59. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) and 1104(a)(1) (A) specifically state the plan
must inure to the exclusive benefit of the employee participants. I.R.C. § 401 (a) (2)
(West 1982) also imposes the exclusive benefit rule on employee benefit plans. See
infra notes 153-67 and accompanying text.
60. H. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5093. See also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 459 (10th Cir. 1978),
the plan may be acquired through direct employee contributions 61
or with the proceeds of a loan to the trust. 6 2 Additionally, under
the rules applicable to tax-qualified plans, employee benefits from
an ESOP are generally not taxed until distributed or made avail-
able. 63 The Internal Revenue Code also provides for special ten-
year income averaging64 or tax-free rollover treatment for lump
sum distributions to participants and beneficiaries. 65 The Internal
Revenue Code allows a deferral of tax on appreciation of em-
ployer securities 66 and an estate and gift tax exclusion. 67
The ESOP, although flexible, is complex. A well-defined plan,
with proper communication,6 8 tailored to the right company,
should benefit both the employees and the sponsor corporation.
Purposes for establishing an ESOP include: 1) a motivational pro-
gram; 2) an employee benefit program; 3) a retirement income
supplement; and 4) a corporate financing technique.69 A pension
wherein the court states that ESOPs are, by definition, "designed to invest primar-
ily in qualifying employer securities. . . ." Id.
61. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
62. An ESOP established from proceeds of a loan is known as a leveraged em-
ployee stock ownership plan. (LESOP). See Testa & Bachleder, supra note 8, at
38,042.
63. I.R.C. § 402(a)(1) (West 1982).
64. I.R.C. § 402(e)(1) (West 1982). Under the ten-year averaging method the
distributee is taxed on an amount which is equal to an initial separate tax multi-
plied by a fraction. The numerator is the ordinary income portion of the lump
sum distribution and the denominator is the total taxable amount of the lump sum
distribution. Id. See generally ESOPs Tables: A Survey of Companies with Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plans, 6 J. CORP. L., 551, 576 1981 [hereinafter cited as ES-
OPs Tables].
65. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(A)(ii), (D)(iv) (West 1982). See generally, Comment,
How to Accomplish a Successful Tax-Free Pension Plan Rollover, 8 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 933 (1981); ESOPs Tables, supra note 64, at 577.
66. I.R.C. § 402(a)(1) (West 1982). See ESOPs Tables, supra note 64, at 576.
67. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 347 (1982) [hereinafter cited as TEFRA] was signed by President Reagan on
September 3, 1982. The estate tax exclusion was modified therein. "An aggregate
limit of $100,000 is placed on the estate tax exclusion for benefits payable to a ben-
eficiary . . . of a deceased employee under a qualified plan (pension, profit-shar-
ing, etc. plan) ... Previously, the estate tax exclusion for such plans was
unlimited. The $100,000 limit applies to estates of decedents dying after December
31, 1982." TAX EQurry AND FiscAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 - LAW AND EXPLANA-
TION (CCH) (Aug. 1982) at 28.
68. ERISA requires the administrator of the plan to duly disclose and report
to participants and beneficiaries a summary of the plan, provide additional infor-
mation and report the method and distribution of benefits, inter alia. See ERISA,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025.
69. 1981 PENS. & PROFIT SHARING (P-H) $ 6,653. See generally ESOPs Tables,
supra note 65. In Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1018 (10th Cir. 1972), the court
notes four benefits derived from an employee stock ownership trust: 1) employees
have greater pride in their work; 2) employee turnover has been reduced in all
phases of operation; 3) it can pin down several of the key personnel in the younger
age bracket; and 4) it can help materially in production and labor relations. Addi-
tionally, the incentive for an employee to remain with the firm with an employee
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plan offered by the employer and impliedly accepted by the em-
ployee by remaining in employment constitutes a contract be-
tween them, whether the plan is a public or private one, and
whether or not the employee is to contribute funds to the pension
fund.70 However, from the employee's point of view, there may be
several disadvantages associated with the establishment of an
ESOP by his corporate employer. Disadvantages may be: 1) an
ESOP inevitably results in a high concentration of trust assets in
the stock of a single corporation; 71 2) the employer's stock may
not be a desirable investment for an employee's trust;72 and
3) the flexibility of a managed portfolio is lacking in an ESOP.73
Additionally, management may be faced with several potential
problems if an ESOP is established. Potential dilution of corpo-
rate stock is one possible disadvantage. Further, employee own-
ership of marginal companies, poorly managed, and in declining
industries, is of dubious merit74
An ESOP must be initiated in good faith75 by the sponsor em-
ployer.76 A repurchase tender offer,77 if made for the purpose of
funding an ESOP, or for the purpose of effectuating a valid coin-
pany policy favoring ownership of stock by employees, is a proper
corporate purpose. However, if the establishment of an ESOP is
simply a sham to force out minority shareholders, the repurchase
tender offer lacks the good faith prerequisite. 78 Thus, the motive
behind the corporation as the plan sponsor will influence any
challenge to the validity of the purpose of the establishment and
benefit plan was noted in Litwicki v. PPG Indus., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 296, 305 (W.D.
Pa. 1973), affd, 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974).
70. Hunter v. Spaulding, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 722-23, 197 P.2d 807, 815 (1948).
71. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) excuses an ESOP trustee from the obliga-
tion of diversifying investments.
72. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2) specifically indicates that the trustee's duty
to act prudently is left intact despite the fact that diversification of investment is
not required. Query: is it prudent for a trustee of an ESOP to invest in a
financially unsound corporation?
73. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a) (2).
74. 1981 PENS. & PRoFrr SHARING (P-H) $ 6,655.
75. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), affd,
490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); see Developments,
supra note 8, at 283.
76. A "plan sponsor" is defined in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B): "[tihe term
'plan sponsor' means (1) the employer in the case of an employee benefit plan es-
tablished or maintained by a single employer .... ." Id.
77. See supra note 9.
78. See Developments, supra note 8, at 284.
operation of the ESOP.79
Factors to consider in determining whether a plan has been set
up for the benefit of the employees include the corporate resolu-
tion of the board of directors, the timing of the establishment (i.e.,
was the plan set up while the firm was threatened with a hostile
takeover?), and who is appointed to the fiduciary and administra-
tive positions in the plan. Also, voting control of the ESOP
shares, whether vested in the trustee or employees themselves,
will be a relevant factor.
In Weinberg v. Cameron8o and Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corporation, 81
the court closely examined the motive behind the establishment
of the ESOP. In Weinberg, the ESOP was used to increase em-
ployee pension benefits, which the district court held to be in pur-
suit of a legitimate corporate purpose.82 However, the district
court in Klaus issued an injunction against the voting of the
ESOP shares because the principal motive was self-serving for
the incumbent corporate management rather than, a bona fide in-
terest in promoting employee welfare.83
Five types of transactions occur during the operation of an
ESOP: 1) issuance of interests in the plan to participants; 2) ac-
quisition of employer securities by the plan trustee;84 3) alloca-
tion of employer securities to individual participant accounts; 4)
distribution of employer securities to participants; and 5) sales of
distributed employer securities to participants and beneficiaries. 85
In the corporate takeover setting, the second transaction listed
79. Id.
80. 1980 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,377 (D. Hawaii March 21, 1980).
81. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
82. The court was presented with evidence indicating that the ESOP had the
effect of giving the present managemnt an absolute lock-in on the voting of shares
of the stock in trust at the time it was set up. However, the court found that the
establishment of the ESOP and the sale of company shares to the ESOP was not
done solely for the purpose of controlling or influencing control of the corporation.
The ESOP arose out of a management effort to assist both present and retired cor-
porate employees. The plan was designed primarily to benefit the employees, not
corporate management.
83. The district court found that Hi-Shear lacked good faith in the establish-
ment of the ESOP. The ESOP adversely affected Klaus, a minority shareholder
who sought control of Hi-Shear. Hi-Shear failed to advance any compelling reason
why the ESOP had to be established at a time so advantageous to those in control.
The timing of the establishment of the ESOP hampered Klaus' endeavor to take
over Hi-Shear. If the plan had been set up a few months later, the unfair advan-
tage afforded Hi-Shear at Klaus' expense would not have been apparent. The in-
junction on voting the shares was later vacated. See generally Klaus v. Hi-Shear
Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
84. Drisdale, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Securities Law, 32 BAYLOR
L. REV. 19, 22 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ESOPs and Securities Laws].
The Internal Revenue Service has stated in a "no-action" letter that registration
is not required when the plan purchases securities from the employer. Id.
85. See supra note 4.
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above is the primary maneuver used to avert the takeover. Crea-
tive financial, legal, and corporate executives have seized the op-
portunity to utilize an ESOP not only for use as an employee
benefit plan, but also to serve the additional task as a defense
tool. As a tactic, the ESOP places substantial additional stock in
the hands of friendly parties8 6 which aids incumbent manage-
ment in averting a takeover.
IV. SEC CONSIDERATIONS
ESOPs deal with corporate securites for the benefit of partici-
pants and beneficiaries. ERISA alone does not govern the entire
spectrum of transactions involved in the establishment and oper-
ation of an ESOP. The Internal Revenue Code requirements as
well as those rules and regulations promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission must be followed.87
Depending on the structure of a particular plan, the administra-
tive committee, the plan trustees and the employee participants
may be subject to the filing requirements of section 13(d) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.88 A trustee of an ESOP
holds beneficial ownership of the stock.89 Rule 13d-3(a) defines
beneficial ownership.89 Beneficial ownership exists because the
trustee will be given some independently exercisable powers, in-
cluding the right to retain or dispose of securities held by the
plan. In a no-action letter,90 the SEC stated that because an
ESOP may tender significant quantities of employer stock, the
tender offer rules should be observed. However, in LTV v. Grum-
man Corp.,91 the district court found that Grumman's massive
buying of its stock on the open market, along with its attendant
press releases indicating its intention to do so was to defeat the
tender offer of LTV, did not itself constitute a tender offer for pur-
86. See also supra note 4, see generally ESOPs and Securities Laws, supra
note 85; Miler, ESOPs/Stock Bonus Plans: Comments on Their Pas Present and
Future, 1 PENS. & PROFrr SHARING TAX J., 167, 179-80 (1975).
87. San Jose Water Works, FED. SEC. L. RPTR. (CCH) 81,196 (April 7, 1977).
88. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 FED. SEC. L. Rr'R.
(CCH) 23,662.
89. Id. Under Rule 13d-3(a), a person is the beneficial owner of shares if he
has or shares, directly or indirectly, the power to vote or direct the voting of such
shares; or if he has or shares, directly or indirectly, the right to receive or direct
the receipts of dividends or proceeds of sale with respect to such shares. See Lip-
ton, supra note 4, at 94. See generally ESOPs Tables, supra note 64, at 592.
90. Schaevitz Eng'r, 516 SEC. REG. & L. RprR. (BNA) C-1 (Sept. 12, 1979).
91. 526 F. Supp. 106 (E.D.N.Y 1981).
poses of SEC filing requirements and reporting.92
Additionally, if the plan beneficially owns more than ten per-
cent of the corporation's registered equity securities, the trust
and trustees must file reports under section 16(a) of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934.93 However, exemptions from re-
porting requirements may be granted. Using banks as trustees,
many exemptions from registration and reporting requirements,
both as to the interests in the plan and the underlying employer
securities, are available. The full benefit of these exemptions may
be realized if the bank trustee is independent of the issuing cor-
poration. Consequently, the trustee bank should not be con-
trolled by the plan's administrative committee with respect to the
time, price or amount of securities purchased. 94
In Weinberg v. Cameron, 95 the court failed to find an SEC viola-
tion from the actions of the management of the corporation, The
offer did not constitute a proxy solicitation in violation of the Se-
curities and Exchange Act of 1934 or Hawaii state law. The com-
pany transferred shares of its stock to the ESOP which in turn
allowed management to vote the shares. 96
Thus, although an ESOP is principally governed by the statu-
tory provisions of ERISA, the plan sponsor should carefully con-
sider and analyze the application and effect of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's rules and regulations. The manner in
which the plan operates through its appointed administrators ap-
pears to be a key determinant as to whether SEC rules apply.
V. DUAL AND DIVIDED LOYALTY-CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DUTIES
OF OFFICER OR DIRECTOR AND TRUSTEE OF AN ESOP
The dual loyalty problem arises in the corporate takeover sce-
nario when the trustees of the ESOP are also officers and/or di-
92. Id. at 109.
93. Section 16(a) states in pertinent part: "[elvery person who is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of equity
security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to sec-
tion 12 of this title... shall file ... a statement with the Commission .... Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 p (1971).
94. Selection of an independent trustee is advantageous because it may deter
future problems arising under the fiduciary standard set forth under ERISA. ES-
OPs and Securities Laws, supra note 84, at 48-49.
95. 1980 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,377 (D. Hawaii March 21, 1980).
96. But see Monogram Indus., Inc. v. Royal Indus., Inc., Civ. No. 76-3356R, (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 17 and Dec. 13, 1976), wherein the court held that an improperly moti-
vated defensive manuever may be preliminary enjoined as a violation of § 14(e) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and/or as a breache of fiduciary duty. Ac-
cord Orbanco v. Security Bank of Ore., 371 F. Supp. 125, 128 (D.C. Or. 1974) (Wil-
liams Act and its implementing regulations strictly regulate purchases by target
company or its management; the policy is to guarantee full disclosure to public).
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rectors of the sponsor corporation. The duties of a fiduciary of an
ESOP may directly conflict with the position of a corporate officer
or director. Action which may be in the best interest of the
ESOP, either in the long or short run, may be adverse to corpo-
rate objectives as stated by top corporate management.
It is a well-established rule of corporate law that officers 97 and
directors98 are in the position of a fiduciary for corporate share-
holders. Officers and directors of a corporation have a fiduciary
duty to treat all shareholders, majority and minority, fairly and
must always act in good faith.99 Coupled with the fiduciary duty
placed upon officers and directors who are appointed trustees of
an ESOP, 'the'position involves the utmost in due care and good
faith.10 0 Standards for the officers and directors appointed to op-
erate an ESOP are set by the traditional common law of trusts
and corporate law, plus the statutory provisions of ERISA.
Corporate management has the affirmative duty to oppose a
takeover offer that it has determined to be adverse or detrimental
to the interests of the corporation or its shareholders. Ot In arriv-
ing at such a decision, however, management should be scrupu-
97. "Officer" means: 1) the chairman of the board of directors, president,
treasurer, secretary, controller and, to the extent not encompassed by the forego-
ing, the chief executive, operating, financial, legal and accounting officers of a cor-
poration; 2) a vice-president or other employee who participates or has the
authority to participate, other than as a director, in major policy making functions
of a corporation; or, 3) any other individual designated as an officer of the corpora-
tion. RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE
§ 1.17 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982).
98. "Director" means any individual designated as a director by the corpora-
tion, and any individual who, in accordance with applicable law or a standard of
the corporation (i.e. by-laws, corporate charter), acts in place of a director. RE-
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE § 108 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1982).
99. Treadway v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 653, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also
Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 176 A.2d 309 (1941). In Yasik, the court held that
directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its shareholders.
The primary duty is to deal fairly and justly. However, officers and directors of a
corporation although fiduciaries do not hold title to the property of the corpora-
tion. Therefore, officers and directors are not trustees. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 16A, comment a (1959).
100. While the law does not demand infallibility or the impossibility of error in
directors, it does require that they act as reasonable men and in good faith to their
stockholders. Casson v. Bosman, 137 N.J. 532, 535, 45 A.2d 807 (1946).
101. Management has not only the right but the duty to resist by any lawful
means persons whose attempt to win control of the corporation, which, if success-
ful, would harm the corporate enterprise. Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir.
1977). See also McPhail v. L.S. Starret Co., 257 F.2d 388, 394-96 (1st Cir. 1958);
Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
lously fair in considering the merits of any proposal submitted to
its stockholders. Strict impartiality is required by virtue of the
fiduciary position. If management determines the takeover at-
tempt is contrary to the best interests of the shareholders, then
management may take any steps necessary to lawfully counter
the attempted takeover. 0 2
Courts, in analyzing actions of corporate officers, will consider
whether the action taken was in accordance with sound business
judgment103 and to further a valid corporate purpose.10 4 The issu-
ance of shares for the purpose of defeating a takeover, as in the
case of an ESOP, may be proper if such issuance will avert detri-
mental consequences to shareholders. The issuance, however,
cannot be for the sole or primary purpose of sustaining incum-
bent management.
105
A president or treasurer considers his pi-imary concern to be
the profitability of the enterprise. These officers may be in a Ipar-
ticularly difficult position of divided loyalty between the ESOP
and the sponsor corporation. The board of directors' primary re'
sponsibility is to the corporate shareholders. Again, the difficult
position of divided loyalty is apparent.106 Although a trustee may
have dual loyalties by virtue of his position in the corporation and
ESOP respectively, when acting on behalf of the ESOP, primary
102. Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
(suit individually and derivatively by minority shareholders to enjoin corpora-
tion's purchase of seller's one-half interest of joint venture). See also Donovan v.
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1982). The court criticized the director's fail-
ure to fully analyze the tender offer of LTV in deciding to fend off the takeover.
The trustees failed to perform a thorough investigation in ascertaining the facts
with respect to the LTV pension funds, the unfunded liabilities of which were to
be the principal ground for their action. No preliminary action was taken to dis-
cover if steps could be taken to protect the Grumman pension in the event of an
acquisition of Grumman by LTV.
103. See Selheimber v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 224 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1966); MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 35. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977) addresses the perform-
ance of duties by a director: "[a] director shall perform the duties of a director,
... in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977).
104. Treadway v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The district
court held that "even a transaction carried out at the 'eleventh hour' which effec-
tively blocks a takeover attempt, but which also serves to further a valid purpose,
may be permissible." Id. Accord, McPhail v. L.S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388, 395
(1st Cir. 1958). In McPhail, the court failed to infer some improper ulterior or self-
ish purpose. Evidence indicated the directors acted in the laudable purpose of
frustrating a raid by a minority shareholder. The suit was brought by a minority
shareholder to enjoin the corporation from putting an employee stock ownership
plan into operation. See generally Developments, supra note 8, at 197.
105. See Lipton, supra note 4.
106. 1982 PENS. & PRorrr SHARING (P-H) $ 20,119.
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loyalty to the fund is the sole loyalty which should guide his
judgment.107
ERISA contemplates the existence and approval of fiduciary ac-
tion on behalf of an employee benefit plan where dual loyalties
may exist.108 ERISA recognizes that trustees, as officers of the
sponsor corporation, may act on behalf of the plan in making in-
vestment decisions concerning employer stock even though there
may be a potential conflict of interest.10 9
An extraordinary obligation is imposed upon an individual with
dual loyalties to act fairly and in the best interests of the partici-
pants and beneficiaries of an ESOP.110 A duty is imposed on the
trustees to avoid placing themselves in a position where their acts
as officers or directors will prevent their functioning with com-
plete loyalties to participants of the employee benefit plan."l
A fiduciary will act in the best interests of the participants and
beneficiaries, despite dual loyalty and a potential conflict of inter-
est, so long as: 1) he acts exclusively for the benefit of the plan;" 2
and 2) his actions are not violative of the proscriptions of section
1106113 of ERISA.114 Compliance with the duty of loyalty is even
more difficult in the area of plan administration as compared to.
plan investment1 5 of the, ESOP. The exclusive benefit rule appli-
cable to the conduct of plan fiduciaries is unavoidable. However,
an incidental benefits16 accruing to the corporation is permissible.
107. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
108. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 469. See also Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of New York, 447
F. Supp. 1248, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), arfd mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979) (apply-
ing common law principles of fiduciary duty).
111. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 271.
112. See infra notes 153-6o' and accompanying text. See also Donovan v.
Bierwirth, 638 F. Supp. at 469.
113. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1_06 deals with prohibited transactions of a fiduciary
with respect to transactions with the employee benefit plan.
114. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. at 469.
115. 1982 PENS. & PROFIT SI-RING (P-H) 20, 255. The trust instrument states
employer securities are to be bought for the ESOP. However, the time of the
purchase and sale or securities is an administrative fiduciary function. ERISA
must be construed to differentiate between advocating a course of action or a solu-
tion and having the power to take the course or implement the particular solution.
Curren v. Freitag, 432 F. Supp. 668, 672 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
116. In Culinary Workers & Bartenders Union No. 596 Health & Welfare Trust v.
Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 353, 362-63, 588 P.2d 1334, 1341 (1979), later appeal,
630 P.2d 1348 (1981), the court stated: "we do not believe a finding of violation of
fiduciary duty is warranted in situations . .. where there is no showing that the
The Internal Revenue Service has stated, pursuant to section
401(a), that benefits need not be exclusively for the participants
and beneficiaries. Rather, transactions need only be '"primarily"
for the benefit of such persons."iT
Thus, officers and directors tread a fine line between the poten-
tial conflict of interest which may arise while acting simultane-
ously in the corporate capacity and as an ESOP trustee. In day-
to-day management, the objectives and goals of the corporation
and the ESOP will generally coincide. However, when an ESOP
is employed to avoid a corporate takeover, it is apparent that con-
flicts may arise.
VI. FIDUCIARY DUTY OF THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR AND OFFICER
ACTING AS A TRUSTEE OF AN ESOP
A fiduciary of an ESOP is defined in ERISA, section 1002(21):
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exer-
cises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting man-
agement of such plan or excerises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice
for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsi-
bility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of- such plan....
Persons in charge of a profit-sharing and pension plan have a
statutory fiduciary duty to uphold the purpose of the plan."i8 Per-
sonal liability is imposed if a person responsible for enforcing the
plan breaches the statutory fiduciary duty. A fiduciary not only
may be exposed to personal liability1 9 for his individual breach,
fiduciary's collateral interest impaired a trust fund's operation or a beneficiary's
interest." Accord Schwartz v. Marien, 27 N.Y.2d 487, 492, 335 N.E. 2d 334, 338, 373
N.Y.S.2d 122, 127 (1975); Treadway Companies v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 653
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). See Developments, supra note 8, at 28; see also infra notes 164-65
and accompanying text.
117. Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88, addresses the incidental benefit which may
accrue to an entity other than the participants and beneficiaries of the plan:
The primary purpose of benefiting employees or their beneficiaries must
be maintained with respect to investments of the trust fund as well as
with respect to other activities of the trust. This requirement, however,
does not prevent others from also deriving some benefit from a transac-
tion with the trust. For example, a sale of securities at a profit benefits the
seller, but if the puchase price is not in excess of the fair market value of
the securities at the time of sale and the applicable investment requisites
have been met, the investment is consistent with the exclusive-benefit-of-
employees requirement.
Id. See generally Professional Money Managers, supra note 24, at 528-30.
118. Fine v. Semet, 514 F. Supp. 34, 41-45 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
119. Id. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(c) (1), 1104,1106(b) & 1109. See also supra
notes 33 & 34 & infra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
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but also for the breach of a fiduciary duty by a co-fiduciary.120
Fiduciary duties are set forth in ERISA, section 1104,121 which
states in pertinent part:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive
purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;
and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; 12 2 (B)
with care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent raan acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like charactei-
and with like aims....
The fiduciary must comply with the provisions of the plan in-
strument to the extent it is consistent with the provisions of ER-
ISA.123 To insure that the fiduciary complies with the provisions
of the plan instrument and ERISA, the performance of the fiduci-
ary, as well as others associated with the plan, should be re-
viewed at reasonable intervals by an appointed fiduciary.1 24
There is no required number of fiduciaries to maintain the ESOP,
but each plan must have at least one named fiduciary who serves
120. Liability for the breach of fiduciary duty by co-fiduciary is stated in ER-
ISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a):
[A] fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable for a breach of fiduciary
responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the same plan in the fol-
lowing circumstances: (1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly
undertakes to conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing
such act or omission is a breach; (2) if, by his failure to comply with sec-
tion 404(a) (1) of this title in. the administration of his specific responsibili-
ties which give rise to his status as a fiduciary, he has enabled such other
fiduciary to commit a breach; or (3) if he has knowledge of a breach by
such other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable efforts under the cir-
cumstances to remedy the breach.
Id.
121. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) embodies the central and fundamental obli-
gation imposed on fiduciaries by ERISA. The court in Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453,
457 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 426 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Okla. 1976) commented that this
section of ERISA contains:
[a] carefully tailored law of trusts, including the familiar requirements of
undivided loyalty to beneficiaries, the prudent man rule, the rule requir-
ing diversification of investments and the requirement that fiduciaries
comply with the provisions of plan documents to the extent that they are
not inconsistent with the Act.
Id. See also Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 350 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
122. See DONOVAN, 538 F. Supp. at 475. In Donovan, the court questioned the
payment of $86,850 in brokerage fees when the trustees of the plan bought shares
to avert the takeover by LTV.
123. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978), af'd, 426 F. Supp. 830
(W.D. Okla. 1975).
124. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,598 (1975).
as plan administrator.125 Additionally, since the assets of the plan
are held in trust under an ESOP, at least one trustee must be
appointed.
Fiduciaries are limited to persons who perform one or more of
the functions described in ERISA section 1002(21) (A) with re-
spect to an ESOP. There is an emphasis on the discretionary na-
ture of the duties of the fiduciary. Persons performing ministerial
duties 126 are not fiduciaries because these individuals do not have
discretionary authority or control over the management of the
plan or disposition of assets. A named fiduciary must be stated in
the plan instrument. 27 The purpose of a named fiduciary is to al-
low employee participants and beneficiaries to obtain information
and seek resolution of any dispute.128
Fiduciaries include not only named fiduciaries, but any ap-
pointed fiduciaries.12 9 Section 1105(c) (1) (B) states that the in-
strument under which a plan is maintained may expressly
provide for procedures "for named fiduciaries to designate per-
sons other than named beneficiaries to carry out fiduciary respon-
125. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(16) (A) defines a plan administrator:
The term "administrator" means - (i) the person specifically so designated
by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated; (ii) if an
administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or (iii) in the case of
a plan for which an administrator is not designated and a plan sponsor
cannot be identified, such other person as the Sectretary may by regula-
tion prescribe.
Id.
126. Interpretive Bulletins Relating to Fiduciary Responsibility, 40 Fed. Reg.
47,491 (1975) lists ministerial duties involved in the operation of an employee ben-
efit plan. These consist of:
1) application of rules determining eligibility participation and benefits;
2) calculation of services and compensation credits for benefits;
3) preparation of employee communications materials;
4) maintenance of participants service and employment records;
5) preparation of reports required by government agencies;
6) calculation of benefits;
7) orientation of new participants and advising participants of their
rights and options under the plan;
8) collection of contributions and application of contributions as provided
in the plan;
9) preparation of reports concerning participant's benefits;
10) processing of claims;
11) making recommendations to others for decisions with respect to plan
administration.
The Internal Revenue Services, in defining the fiduciary, within the meaning of
§ 4975(e) (3) of IRC of 1954, as amended, does not list persons performing ministe-
rial duties.
127. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1) (A). A named fiduciary must be designated
so that employees may determine who is responsible for operating the plan. See
generally Fiduciary Responsibility, supra note 33, at 89; and Fiduciaries Under
ERISA, supra note 24, at 8.
128. Id.
129. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1)(B).
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sibilities (other than trustee responsibilities) under the plan."130
The board of directors or any committee which appoints
fiduciaries should carefully review the qualifications of any per-
son selected and undertake a reasonably comprehensive and peri-
odic review of the fiduciary's performance in order to protect
against personal liability for failing to select a competent
fiduciary. 131
Self-dealing132 is addressed in ERISA section 1106(b). "Deal-
ing" as applied to fiduciaries exists when the fiduciary possesses
the power to compromise the positions of his employer, the em-
ployee benefit fund, or both. Section 1106(b) states in pertinent
part that a fiduciary, with respect to a plan shall not:
(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own
account,
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any transaction involv-
ing the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests
are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interest of its participants or
beneficiaries .... 133
The Internal Revenue Code also prohibits fiduciaries from dealing
with the assets or income of a plan for his own account and bene-
fit.1a4 Fiduciaries must guard the interests of the employees. 135
Trustees must exercise their fiduciary trust in good faith and
deal fairly with the employee participants and beneficiaries of an
ESOP.136 Congress intended that the assets of the plan should
never inure to the benefit of the trustee/fiduciary,137 thus forbid-
130. Id.
131. Professional Money Managers, supra note 24, at 524.
132. Curren v. Freitag, 432 F. Supp. at 672.
133. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b); see also AM. JuR. 2d New Topic Service Pen-
sion Reform Act § 133 (1975).
134. I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1) (West 1982) states; "the term 'prohibited transaction'
means any direct or indirect . . . act by a disqualified person who is a fiduciary
whereby he deals with the income or assets of a plan in his own intdrests or for
his own account. . . ." Id.
135. Under the guise of opposing what they claim to be an unfavorable take-
over, management may not attempt to manipulate the issuance or sale of stock for
the purpose of perpetrating thejir control over the corporation. Treadway v. Care
Corp., 490 F. Supp. 653, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing
Co., 478 F. Supp. 357, 361 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (action brought for alleged violation of
fiduciary duties under ERISA).
136. Symington v. City of Albany, 5 Cal. 3d 23, 33, 485 P.2d 270, 276, 95 Cal. Rptr.
206, 212 (1971).
137. Although Congress intends a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with re-
spect to the plan solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries, an inciden-
tal benefit to the corporation deriving from the ESOP has been recognized. See
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
ding self-dealing in assets of the fund.138 Additionally, the fiduci-
ary is forbidden from granting preferences as between plan
participants and beneficiaries in the allocation of contributions
and distribution of benefits.
A possible conflict exists between the duties and obligations of
a fiduciary and the requirement of prudent investment. Under
some circumstances, the trustee's responsibility to the plan may
require him to tender the securities 13 9 or sell. the shares in the
market. The offer by the employer of the securities held by the
ESOP may be profitable as opposed to the retention of the stock
in the trust.140 However, the trustee may have an obligation
under the terms of the trust which requires him to retain the se-
curities.14 1 Although ERISA grants trustees broad managerial
and administrative discretion in the operation of the plan,142 the
fiduciary responsibility standards imposed by common law, corpo-
rate law, and ERISA must be strictly followed. 143
Fiduciaries may be selected from the plan sponsor corporation
or from outside service groups such as banks. According to ER-
ISA section 1102(c) (1), any person or group of persons may serve
in more than one fiduciary capacity. A person'" may serve both
as a trustee and administrator. Even the corporation may be a
fiduciary. Insofar as a corporation maintains the plan for its em-
138. Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp. of Ill. Precision Castings Div., 456 F. Supp. 559,
565 (N.D. Ohio 1978). See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
139. In Donovan, 680 F.2d at 274, had the trustees tendered the shares to LTV,
the tender offerer, a substantial profit for the ESOP would have realized. In the
Bendix-Martin Marietta takeover, when Citibank, the trustee of the Bendix ESOP,
tendered the plan's shares at the price of $85.00, there was a substantial potential
profit for the ESOP. See generally supra note 3.
140. See generally supra note 3.
141. Carlson, supra note 8, at 299 n.29.
142. Taylor v. Bakery & Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455 F.
Supp. 816, 819 (E.N.C. 1978). See also Sample v. Monsanto Co., 485 F. Supp. 1018,
1019 (E.D. Mo. 1980). Further, the fiduciary of a pension plan has more freedom
and opportunity to make investment decisions than a common law trustee. See
supra note 21 and accompanying text. Additionally, in Marshall v. Teamster Local
282 Pension Trust Fund, 458 F. Supp. 986, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), the court states that
there is "substantial reason to believe that Congress did not intend to compel the
courts to rely exclusively on the common law when drawing the contours of ER-
ISA's fiduciary standards." Id.
143. In Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 1979), the court accepted
the Secretary of Labor's argument that a per se violation of § 1106(b) (2) was pres-
ent. Identical trustees of two employee benefit plans, whose participants and ben-
eficiaries were not identical, effected a loan between the plans. The loan was not
exempt under the provisions of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1108. Fiduciary misconduct
need not be shown before the act is violated, and harm to the participants and
beneficiaries inflicted. Accord Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (loth Cir. 1978).
144. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) states: "The term 'person' means an individual,
partnership, joint venture, corporation, mutual company, joint-stock company,
trust, estate, unincorporated organization, association or employee organization."
Id.
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ployees, and administers the plan through its directors, officers,
and employees, it will be considered a fiduciary subject to liability
under ERISA.145
Officers and directors of the corporation may be designated
fiduciaries under an ESOP. In Eaves v. Penn, 146 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit found the officers and directors of the
plan sponsor to be fiduciaries under ERISA.147 The fiduciary sta-
tus resulted by virtue of the officer and director activities in rec-
ommending, designing, and implementing an amendment to
transform a profit sharing plan to an ESOP.148 Members of the
board of directors of a sponsor corporation will be designated
fiduciaries149 if duties and responsibilities with respect to the plan
involve the obligations stated in ERISA section 1002(21) (A).150
However, it is disadvantageous to name a board of directors as
the trustee of an ESOP because of the potential conflict of inter-
est and dual loyalty to the employee benefit plan and the
corporation.151
Plan trustees and administrators are fiduciaries of an ESOP.152
145. 1982 PENS. & PROFIT SHARING (P-H) 20,072.
146. 587 F.2d 453, 458-59 (10th Cir. 1978).
147. Id. at 459. In Marshall v. DeKeyer, 485 F. Supp. 629, 640-41 (W.D. Wis.
1979), the court held:
(0] fficials of a company which sponsors a plan are themselves fiduciaries
to the extent that they retain authority for selection and retention of plan
fiduciaries because, to that extent, they have retained 'discretionary au-
thority or discretionary control respecting management of the plan'....
While it is indeed contemplated under ERISA that a corporation, as an en-
tity, may be a plan fiduciary, the analysis does not end there. Individuals
within the corporation who exercise the type of authority or control de-
,scribed in section 3(21) (A) of ERISA will themselves be fiduciaries with
respect to the plan.
Id. at 640-41.
148. In Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457-59 (10th Cir. 1978), the defendant, an of-
ficer and director, recommended, designed and implemented an amendment in the
corporation's profit sharing plan to an ESOP. The court held that the structure of
ERISA itself requires that an individual making an investment decision be a
fiduciary. An ESOP fiduciary, just as a fiduciary in other plans, is governed by the
"solely in the interests" and "prudence" tests stated in ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1104(a) (1) (A) and 1104(a) (1) (B).
149. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,598 (1975). Accord I.R.C. § 4975(e) (3) (West 1982).
150. 1982 PENS. & PRoFIT SHARING (P-H) 20,119. It is disadvantageous to name
a board of directors as trustee of an ESOP because of the potential conflict of in-
terest and dual loyalties to the employee benefit plan and the corporation.
151. Id.
152. Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 634-35 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(action brought for alleged violations of fiduciary duties). In Freund, the district
court noted that the fiduciary's state of mind is not determinative of fiduciary sta-
tus under ERISA. Id. at 635.
A plan administrator has discretionary authority as to the mainte-
nance and operation of the ESOP. Thus, the fiduciary duty is an
all-encompassing duty. As a subpart thereof, the "exclusive bene-
fit" and "prudent man" requirements must be defined and ana-
lyzed because these requirements strictly govern an officer or
director in utilizing an ESOP to avert a takeover.
VII. EXCLUSIVE BENEFIT REQUIREMENT-IS THE USE OF AN
ESOP TO AVERT A CORPORATE TAKEOVER FOR THE
EXCLUSIVE BENEFIT OF EMPLOYEE
PARTICIPANTS?
The exclusive benefit rule subjects the fiduciary to an addi-
tional requirement which allows only those actions and invest-
ments designed for the exclusive benefit of the participants and
beneficiaries of an ESOP. Thus, when an ESOP is used as a de-
fense tactic to avoid a takeover, the court will grant relief upon
the showing that such action was not for the exclusive benefit of
the employee benefit plan, but rather, for the primary benefit of
the corporation and incumbent management.
The exclusive benefit requirement for employee benefit plans is
stated in ERISA sections 1103(c) (1) and 1104(a) (1) (A). Section
1103(c)(1) states in pertinent part: "[the assets of a plan shall
never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for
the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the
plan and their beneficiaries ... ." Section 1104(a) (1) (A) states
that the fiduciary shall act solely in the interest of the partici-
pants and beneficiaries "for the exclusive purpose of (i) providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.. .153 Provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code, specifically sections 401154 and 503,
also address the exclusive benefit concept.1 55 Usually, the terms
and conditions of the trust agreement establishing the ESOP will
provide that the plan shall inure only to the exclusive benefit of
participants and beneficiaries.56 The exclusive benefit rule
153. In Talarico v. United Furniture Workers Pension Fund, 479 F. Supp. 1072,
1081 (D. Neb. 1979), the district court stated that in carrying out the obligations im-
posed on employee benefit plan trustees, the trustee's actions must be designed to
protect the plan and its participants and beneficiaries. Thus, trustees must exer-
cise their discretion to serve the interests of all participants of the plan. Accord
Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978). In Eaves, the trustee of an ESOP was
bound by the exclusive benefit and prudent man requirements of ERISA in deter-
mining whether to invest plan funds in employer securities.
154. See supra note 56.
155. The aspect of the exclusive benefit requirement under the Internal Reve-
nue Code will be deemed to have been met if the fiduciary meets the prudent man
rule of the labor provisions (Title 1 of ERISA). H.R. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEws 4639, 5083.
156. Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88. The term "exclusive" is thus transmitted to
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heightens the fiduciary standard, since the fiduciary of an ESOP
must pay special attention to ascertain not only that the invest-
ment is sound, but also that the choice of investment is solely for
the benefit of participants. 5 7 Plan trustees must always dis-
charge their duties and administer the ESOP with the exclusive
benefit rule in mind.158
Legislative history concerning the exclusive benefit standard in-
dicates that while an ESOP may be able to acquire employer se-
curities, the acquisition must be for the sole benefit of the
participants and beneficiaries.I5 9 Commentators have stated that
the existence of an ESOP may present corporate management
with a desire to manipulate the ESOP's holdings contrary to the
best interests of the parl;icipants.16o The trust may be perceived
by mangagement as an extension of the corporation. Therefore,
the ESOP may be manipulated primarily to further corporate
objectives rather than the promotion of employee welfare.' 6'
The exclusive benefit rule may be absolute in that no other in-
direct benefit may inure to other entities or interests. The pri-
mary benefit requirement does not, however, preclude others
from deriving some benefit from a transaction of the ESOP.162
Where a legitimate business purpose for the transaction exists,
even though the transaction may assist the target corporation's
management to defeat a tender offer, the transaction will be
something akin to "primary." Thus, in order to satisfy the "exclusive" benefit re-
quirement under ERISA, certain guidelines should be followed. When the ESOP
administrators engage in a transaction, the following "test" has been suggested:
"1) the cost must not exceed fair market value at the time of purchase; 2) a fair
return commensurate with the prevailing rate must be provided; 3) sufficient li-
quidity must be maintained to permit distributions in accordance with the terms
of the plan; and 4) the safeguards and diversity to which a prudent investor would
adhere must be present." Id. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
157. 1982 PENS. & PRoFrr SHARING (P-H) 20,252.
158. In Donovan, 680 F.2d at 271, the good faith intention of the trustees alone
did not satisfy the exclusive benefit requirement of ERISA.
159. Because the fiduciary duty stated in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) is made
subject to the language of § 1103(c) and (d), congressional intent is that assets of
an employee benefit plan should never inure to the benefit of any employer.
These two sections expressly forbid the employer from self-dealing in fund assets.
See supra note 155. Since assets of the employee benefit plans are to be held for
the exclusive benefit of participants and beneficiaries, plan assets are generally
not to inure to the benefit of the employer. See Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp. of Ill.
Precision Castings Div., 456 F. Supp. 559, 565 (D.C. Ohio 1978).
160. Carlson, supra note 8, at 300.
161. Id.
162. Developments, supra note 8, at 28.
valid.163 When trust funds are invested in employer securities, a
full disclosure must be made stating the reasons for such an ar-
rangement.164 The conditions under which the investments are
made should be stated so that a determination may be made, if
necessary, as to whether the trust serves any purpose other than
constituting a part of a plan for the exclusive benefit of
employees. 165
In Ma-Tran Corp. v. Commissioner166 and Feroleto Steel Co., 167
the Tax Court found that the assets of the employee benefit plan
were not utilized for the exclusive benefit of the participants and
beneficiaries. In Ma-Tran Corp., the assets of a profit sharing
trust were lent at a low interest rate to the employer. It was also
held that other assets were not profitably invested and the plan
was not administered in the best interests of the employees.
The transaction in Feroleto Steel Co. violated the exclusive ben-
efit rule. Applying the exclusive benefit test, the Tax Court held
that the plan's sponsor, not the employee participants, was the
main beneficiary. The return of the investment was less than the
prevailing interest rate at the time of the transaction. The policy
of ERISA to safeguard the plan's assets for the benefit of the re-
cipients was not the primary purpose of the transaction.
The exclusive benefit rule and the prudent man rule, as sub-
parts of the fiduciary standard set forth in ERISA, impose strict
limitations upon the use of an ESOP to thwart a potential corpo-
rate takeover. An officer or director of a corporation acting as a
trustee of the ESOP will face the difficult task of attempting to act
solely on behalf of employee participants while simultaneously
acting as a corporate officer or director.
VIII. THE PRUDENT MAN REQUIREMENT
The officer or director of a corporation appointed as a fiduciary
of an ESOP must act according to the statutory fiduciary stan-
dards outlined in ERISA, and must also act in a prudent manner.
163. Id.
164. Additionally, I.R.C. Reg. §1.401(1)(b)(J)(ii) (West 1982) and Reg.
1.6033(i) (a) set forth reporting requirements for the trust. Every employer trust
qualified under I.R.C. § 401(a) (West 1982), and exempt from federal income taxa-
tion under § 501(a), shall file an annual return. The return, Form 990-P, must in-
clude the information required by Reg. 1.401-1 1969-2 C.B. 88.
165. "Since the merits of an act may be judged under unfavorable circum-
stances, conscientious fiduciaries should meticulously document why they have
taken specific actions. They should give a reasonably good idea of the alternatives
that have been considered and the reasoning that has led to the ultimate deci-
sion." Professional Money Managers, supra note 24, at 522.
166. 70 TC. 158 (1978).
167. 69 T.C. 97 (1977).
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The prudent man requirement is yet another hurdle which must
be overcome before an ESOP may be employed to avert a corpo-
rate takeover.
The prudent man requirement is set forth in ERISA section
1104(a) (1) (B). The prudence rule of ERISA is a standard built
upon certain aspects of traditional trust law.168 Section
1104(a) (1) (B) states that a fiduciary shall discharge his duties
"with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum-
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capac-
ity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims."169
Legislative history indicates that the prudent man rule must be
interpreted bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of
employee benefit plans 17 0 To the extent that a fiduciary meets
the prudent man rule of the labor provisions of Title 1 of ERISA,
the fiduciary will be deemed to meet the aspects of the exclusive
benefit requirement under Title II of ERISA (the Internal Reve-
nue Code provisions).' 7 '
In Eaves v. Penn,'i7 2 the court enunciated the two-fold duty
under the prudent man requirements of ERISA: "[1.] to act in his
relationship to the plan's fund as a prudent man in a similar situ-
ation and under like conditions would act; and [2.] to act consist-
ently with the principles of administering the trust for the
exclusive purposes" of benefiting the participants and
beneficiaries.17 3
The primary consideration in the prudent man analysis is
whether the fiduciary has investigated and analyzed all relevant
factors before acting. Additionally, inquiry must be made to de-
termine if the decision was impartial and primarily for the benefit
168. 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (1974), DOL Reg. § 2550.404 a-i.
169. Id. The first statement, of the requirement that trustees invest the assets
under their control as would "raen of prudence, discretion and intelligence" was in
the case of Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 461 (1830). Compare this stan-
dard with the sound business judgment rule, supra note 103.
170. "The Conference Committee Report explictly instructs the court to inter-
pret the prudent man rule 'bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of em-
ployee benefit plans.' See S. CONF. REP. No. 1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 310 (1974).
See also Marshall v. Teamster Local 282 Pension Trust Fund, 458 F. Supp. 986, 990
(E.D.N.Y. 1979).
171. See supra note 155.
172. 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
173. Id. at 460, (citing S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4066.
of emPloyees.1 74 The trustee of an employee benefit plan
breaches the duty of due care by making an investment unless he
makes an investigation regarding the soundness of the invest-
ment.175 Where the transaction is significant, prudence requires
the fiduciary to make a thorough investigation, especially if any
party in interest is involved. 176
The affirmative obligation on the part of the fiduciary to exer-
cise prudence requires careful evaluation in order to guarantee
the preservation of the trust corpus.177 Preservation of the
ESOP's corpus includes the responsibility to make an independ-
ent inquiry into the merits of a particular investment rather than
relying solely upon the advice of others.178 The case of In Re Tal-
bot's Estate, 179 held that it is a matter of common prudence for a
trustee to request expert advice on investments. Further, consul-
tation with other interested fiduciaries is also required. 180 A plan
fiduciary may rely on data, information, statistics, or analyses fur-
nished by others. However, the fiduciary must exercise due care
in the selection and retention of persons providing such informa-
tion.181 The plan fiduciary will have acted prudently in such se-
lection and retention if he has no reason to doubt the
competence, integrity or responsibility of such persons.182
The standard of prudence dictates that care must be exercised
in documenting all meetings where action is taken concerning the
management and control of assets. Written minutes of all con-
duct should be taken describing each action taken and how each
174. There is an external or objective standard which governs the conduct of
trustees. Likewise, the "conduct of the trustee in making an investment is to be
judged as of the time when he made it and not as of some later time." 3 ScoTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 227 (3d ed. 1967).
175. Id.
176. Am. JuR. New Topic Service, Pension Reform Act, § 133 (1975).
177. 3 SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 227 (3d ed. 1967).
178. Id. at § 227.1. In Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of New York, 447 F.
Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afrd mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979), the benefi-
ciaries of a municipal trust fund established for public school teachers brought an
action against the trustees of the fund. The beneficiaries sought damages and in-
junctive relief prohibiting further investment of pension fund assets in securities
or obligations of New York City. The court found the trustees had acted prudently
although the City of New York was on the verge of bankruptcy.
179. 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 296 P.2d 848, 859 (1956).
180. Carlson, supra note 8, at p.300 .
181. Professional Money Managers, supra note 24, at 524. The Department of
Labor expects that fiduciary of an employee benefit plan not to "blindly" rely upon
the instruction or policies established by other plan fiduciaries. Weintraub, Cop-
ing with ERISA's Prudent Expert Rule, 6 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE, 233, 237
(1981).
182. Professional Money Mangers, supra note 24, at 524.
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trustee voted.183 In Donovan v. Bierwirth, 184 the court paid close
attention to the lack of documentation of the fiduciaries' actions
in utilizing the ESOP to avert a corporate takeover. The board of
directors in Donovan spent a mere ten minutes on ERISA re-
quirements and any ramifications of the pending tender offer.185
A review of a fiduciary's independent investigation is one of the
well-established yardsticks courts have customarily used to test
whether a fiduciary's conduct has satisfied the prudence standard,
either at common law or under the statutory provisions set forth
in ERISA.186 In analyzing trustee actions, courts will base their
findings on the prudence of the trustee upon the independent and
thorough investigation performed with respect to the merits of a
particular investment or transaction. 87 If the fiduciary of an
ESOP fails to use proper care and patience in making an investi-
gation, he is liable for losses which result from making an invest-
ment if an appropriate investigation would have disclosed that it
was an improper or disadvantageous transaction for the trust.188
The prudent man requirement is likened to the sound business
judgment rule applicable to directors of a corporation. 89 There-
fore, in acting as a director and trustee, satisfaction of the prudent
man standard will also fulfill the duty to act according to the
sound business judgment standard.
183. Interpretative Bulletin Relating to Fiduciary Responsibility, 40 Fed. Reg.
47,491 (1975).
184. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 19812).
185. Id. at 267.
186. The court applied this test of independent investigation in Donovan, 680
F.2d at 274.
187. Fiduciary Standards, supra note 21, at 965.
188. In Donovan, the court of appeals stated that the fiduciaries would not have
been remiss in their fiduciary duties if a "careful and impartial" inquiry had led to
the reasonable conclusion that purchasing Grumman stock best promoted the in-
terests of the E SOP and its employee participants and beneficiaries. The trustees,
who were also corporate directors and officers, failed to engage independent coun-
sel and refused to fully examine the plan funding consequences in fighting the
takeover attempt by LTV. Id. at 272. Alan D. Lebowitz, Department of Labor Ad-
ministrator for Fiduciary Standards stated: 'rustees must divorce themselves
from the company's financial picture - even if corporate officers - and must act
independently in the plan's best interests." Id. Torn between corporate loyalty
and fiduciary duty, the trustees of the Grumman ESOP subjected the plan to
needless risk. The trustees invested in Grumman securities known to be diminish-
ing in value, whether or not the corporate takeover succeeded. See 1982 PENS. &
PROFIT SHARING (P-H) $ 17.4.
189. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
IX. INDEMNIFICATION
An officer or director acting as a trustee of an ESOP will be per-
sonally liable for any losses incurred by his failure to meet the re-
quired fiduciary standard. 190 Transactions utilizing the ESOP to
avert a corporate takeover may violate the fiduciary standards of
exclusive benefit and prudence. Monetary liabilty may be
avoided by an indemnification clause provided in the trust
instrument.
ERISA section 1110(a) states: "any provision in an agreement
or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsi-
bility or liability for any responsibility, obligation or duty... shall
be void as against public policy." However, section 1110(a) ap-
plies only to exculpatory clauses. 191 Exculpatory clauses are ex-
pressly prohibited by ERISA.192
Although indemnification arrangements do not contravene the
provisions of section 1110(a), parties entering into an indemnifica-
tion agreement should determine whether such agreement com-
plies with the other provisions of ERISA and with applicable state
and federal laws.193 The Department of Labor has interpreted
this section to permit indemnification agreements which do not
relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability under the fiduci-
ary standards set forth in Title 1, Part 4, of ERISA. Therefore, in-
demnification provisions included in the trust instrument or an
amendment thereto 194 which leave the fiduciary fully responsible
and subject to liability, but merely permits another party to sat-
isfy any liability incurred by the fiduciary, will be valid.
For example, ERISA section 1110(b)195 states that a fiduciary or
190. Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255 (D.N.J. 1980).
191. An exculpatory clause is a clause in favor of the trustee which exculpates
him where his power is exercised in good faith. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (rev. 5th
ed. 1979).
192. Fiduciary Standards, supra note 21, at 969.
193. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Fiduciary Responsibility, 40 Fed. Reg.
47,491 (1975). Examples of indemnification provisions which are valid include: 1)
indemnification of a plan fiduciary by (a) an employer, any of whose employees
are covered by the plan, or an affiliate of such employer, or (b) an employee or-
ganization, any of whose members are covered by the plan; and 2) indemnification
by a plan fiduciary of the fiduciary's employees who actually perform services.
194. In Donovan, the Grumman Corporation amended the plan document to
provide indemnification to the trustees for any fines or disbursements they might
incur from their actions in utilizing the ESOP to avoid the takeover of Grumman
by LTV. 680 F.2d at 269. Amendment of the employee benefit plan is provided for
in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (3).
195. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1110(b) states:
Nothing in this subpart shall preclude-
(1) a plan from purchasing insurance for its fiduciaries or for itself to
cover liability or losses occurring by reason of the act or omission of a
fiduciary, if such insurance permits recourse by the insurer against the
fiduciary in the case of a breach of a fiduciary obligation by such fiduciary;
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the employer organization may purchase insurance to cover po-
tential liability for any breach of fiduciary duty. The plan sponsor
may purchase liability insurance which intentionally omits any
recourse by the insurer against the fiduciares of the ESOP. There
is no existing public policy reason which would prohibit the em-
ployee benefit plan sponsor from indemnifying one or more
fiduciaries instead of purchasing liability insurance. 196 The over-
riding concern is the protection of the plan trust, its participants,
and beneficiaries. Therefore, any design or device which permits
the ESOP itself to indemnify the fiduciary for breach of his duties
either under common law or ERISA standards is invalid. 19 7
X. REMEDIES
If an ESOP is improperly used to avert a corporate takeover,
several remedies are available to the employee participants and
beneficiaries. Federal law controls the enforcement of ERISA and
provides relief for the participants and beneficiaries of the
ESOP.198 Trustees of an ESOP, like all fiduciaries, are subject to
judicial sanction upon a showing that they have acted arbitrarily
or capriciously towards the persons to whom their obligations and,
duties run.199 ERISA section 1109(a) 200 is a comprehensive provi-
(2) a fiduciary from purchasing insurance to cover liability under this part
from and for his own account;
(3) an employer or an employee organization from purchasing insurance
to cover potential liability of one or more persons who serve in a fiduciary
capacity with regard to an employee benefit plan.
Id.
196. Developments, supra note 8, at 96. The Department of Labor has stated
that indemnifications of plan fiduciaries from the employer-sponsor corporation
assets are permissible. Kroll & Tauber, Fiduciary Responsibility and Prohibited
Transactions Under ERISA, 14 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 657, 667
(1979). See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
197. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Fiduciary Responsibility, 40 Fed. Reg.
47,491 (1975). The Department of Labor interprets § 1110(a) as rendering void any
arrangement for indemnification of a fiduciary or an employee benefit plan by the
plan. Such an arrangement would have the same result as an exculpatory clause
in that it would, in effect, relieve the fiduciary of responsibility and liability to the
plan by abrogating the plan's right to recover from the fiduciary for breaches of
fiduciary obligations. See generally Fishman, Fiduciary Responsibility Under
ERISA, 10 COLO. LAw. 1635, 1638 (1981).
198. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1). See supra note 45.
199. Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1963). See also Gordon v. ILWU-
PMA Benefit Funds, 616 F.2d 433, 437 (9th Cir. 1980); Bayles v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1979).
200. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) states: "[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities ... shall be personally
sion which illustrates Congress' intent to arm the courts with
broad remedial power to redress the interests of participants and
beneficiaries when they have been adversely affected by a breach
of fiduciary duty.
ERISA grants the federal court broad discretion in fashioning
both legal and equitable relief to promote plan stability. In enact-
ing ERISA, Congress was concerned with the potential transac-
tions which lend themselves to a probability of loss of plan assets
or insider abuse.201
Remedies for fiduciary breach of duty may include removal of
the fiduciary, recission of unlawful transactions, and recovery of
monetary loss to the plan.2 02 Not only is relief available for fiduci-
ary breach of duty, but also, non-fiduciaries as well may be sub-
ject to liability by applying common law trust priniciples. 203
ERISA specifically contemplates a remedy against a non-fiduciary
to "correct" a prohibited transaction.204
In Donovan v. Bierwirth, 205 injunctive relief was granted in or-
der to enjoin the trustees of the plan from voting on the ESOP
stock pending a corporate takeover. In Donovan, the district
court issued a preliminary injunction against the trustees of the
plan. Except upon further order of the court, the trustees of the
ESOP were prohibited from buying, selling, or exercising any
powers, rights, or duties on behalf of the ESOP. Additionally, the
court appointed an investment manager as a receiver pendente
lite206 for the pension plan. On review, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed the appointment of the receiver, 207
stressing that the appointment of a receiver is a harsh remedy
liable ...and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the
court may deem appropriate .. " Id.
201. Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 354 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
202. Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255, 1266-67 (D.N.J. 1980).
203. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
204. Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 642 n.5 (W.D. Wis. 1979);
see also IR.C. § 4975(f) (5) and (h) (West 1982).
205. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982).
206. A receiver pendente lite is a person appointed to take charge of the fund
or property to which the receivership extends while the case remains undecided.
The title to property is not changed by the appointment. The receiver acquires no
title, but only the right of possession as the officer of the court. The object of the
appointment is to secure the property pending the litigation so that it may be ap-
propriated in accordance with the rights of the parties, as they may be determined
by the judgment in the action. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. 457 Schenectady
Ave., 235 A.D. 509, 512, 257 N.Y.S. 413, 417 (1932).
207. 680 F.2d at 276. Although ERISA does not provide specifically for the ap-
pointment of a receiver, such power is conferred in § 1132(a) (5) which allows the
Secretary of Labor to seek "other appropriate equitable relief." Id. In Marshall v.
Snyder, 572 F.2d%894 (2d Cir. 1978), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed and explicitly approved the appointment of a receiver for several em-
ployee benefit plans. See Gallagher, supra note 44, at 764.
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which can only be imposed upon a showing of necessity. The
court commented that the trustees' financial integrity was not at
issue. The trustees were permitted to continue in their fiduciary
capacity with respect to the balance of the plan's assets.20 8
Factors to be considered in granting preliminary relief in an ac-
tion brought for alleged ERISA violations include: "1) the pur-
poses of the trust; 2) the relative pecuniary advantages to the
trust estate of the various remedies [available]; 3) the nature of
the interest of each beneficiary; 4) the practical availability of the
various remedies; and 5) the extent of the deviation from the
terms of the trust required by the adoption of each of the
remedies." 20 9
The court has the authority and duty to enforce the remedy
which is most advantageous to the participants and beneficiaries.
The proper remedy should be conducive to effectuation of the
purpose of the trust.2 10 In the case of an ESOP, the primary pur-
pose for a remedy should be the protection of the assets of the
plan for the benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries.
The trust instrument may state the decision of the management
if the employee benefit plan is conclusive. However, the courts
will review actions taken and decisions made to guard against ca-
price or fraud in an attempt to promote the policy behind ER-
ISA.211 Thus, judicial reivew of the acts of the ESOP trustees in
administering a non-contributory profit-sharing or pension plan,
"is limited to a determination as to whether the trustees acted ar-
bitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith,"212 and provides a remedy
which best serves and furthers the interests of employee partici-
pants and beneficiaries.
208. Donovan, 680 F.2d at 276-77.
209. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d at 462-63 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 214, comment 2(b).
210. Id. at 462.
211. Gehrhardt v. General Motors Corp., 434 F. Supp. 981, 982-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
a'd, 581 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1978).
212. Miller v. Associated Pension Trust, Inc., 541 F.2d 726, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1976);
accord Fontecchio v. United Steelworkers of Am., 476 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Colo. 1979)
(administrators of pension plans are accorded considerable deference to interpret
terms of pension plans, and trustees of pension funds must be sustained as matter
of law unless plaintiff can prove that action taken by administrators was arbitrary
or capricious).
XI. CONCLUSION
The use of an ESOP by corporate directors and officers, while
acting as trustees of an ESOP, to avert a corporate takeover, is
difficult, if not impossible, considering the restrictions imposed by
ERISA and the underlying common law. Acting as a fiduciary of
the ESOP, the officer or director must always adhere to the exclu-
sive benefit rule. Any deviation from the requirement that any
transaction of the ESOP must be in the best interests of the
plan's employee participants and beneficiaries will result in per-
sonal liability.
Additionally, the prudent man requirement places the responsi-
bility on the corporate officer or director of the plan sponsor cor-
poration to thoroughly investigate the merits of the tender offer
proposed by the raider. If, in the best and impartial judgment of
the board of directors, the takeover is detrimental to the share-
holders and corporation, then the director has the affirmative
duty to lawfully counter the tender offer. However, the use of an
ESOP as a tactical maneuver will likely result in violations of the
fiduciary standard. Incumbent management should utilize other
methods to avert the takeover.
An ESOP is a valuable corporate device which confers benefits
upon the employees and the corporation. The employees benefit
by the stability of a plan which will provide future income. One
corporate benefit is improved employee morale. However, the po-
tential benefit to the corporation offered by the use of an ESOP as
a corporate takeover defense tool should be deterred. In light of
ERISA and recent court decisions, the scope of establishment and
operation of an ESOP should be limited to its intended purpose
- an employee benefit plan - not a weapon in the high-power
arena of corporate takeovers.
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